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ABSTRACT
Techniques are presented herein to provide an efficient and secure signature scheme
to authenticate route discovery in Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs). Specifically, the
techniques presented herein provide a scheme where multi-signatures are generated with
cryptographic keys provided by Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) on each Mesh Router
(MR) in the WMN. The keys can protect device identities, which may secure the network
devices against attacks, and, in at least some instances, the cryptographic keys can also
provide authentication and encryption at the software/application level. Overall, the
techniques may eliminate the need for a Key Generation Center (KGC) in the WMN and
do not require MRs to cooperate to construct a signature. Thus, among other advantages,
the techniques described herein may be efficient and inexpensive to implement.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Generally, Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are multi-hop radio networks whose
nodes are Internet Protocol (IP) routers with one or more wireless interfaces, which often
operate based on Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 Wi-Fi
protocols. A backbone of a WMN is typically made up of dedicated wireless nodes called
Mesh Routers (MRs), which may be configured in an ad-hoc mode and use omnidirectional
antennas. With the advent of 802.11ax, wireless bandwidth has become multi-folded and,
thus, WMNs are becoming prominent in ad-hoc wireless network deployments. For
example, WMNs are now often utilized for deployment of IP security cameras, Internet of
Things (IoT) devices etc., in the places where wired connectivity is expensive and/or not
feasible.
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In a WMN, the MRs can be freely organized into any network topology and can
communicate with each other using various protocols, such as Dynamic Source Routing
(DSR) or Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR). However, collectively, the resource
constraints of nodes, the capacity of the wireless medium, the mobility of the nodes, and
the self-organized form of the network, may make it difficult to implement methods for
securing traditional wired networks in ad-hoc wireless mesh networking environment.
Moreover, DSR and OLSR have known vulnerabilities.
For example, DSR is a simple, robust reactive routing protocol that efficiently
constructs routes, guarantees loop-free routing, and provides load balancing. However,
DSR is vulnerable to several forms of attacks by malicious nodes. Meanwhile, OLSR is a
simple, proactive link-state routing protocol that also guarantees loop-free routing,
provides load balancing. However, OLSR is less reliable than DSR and is also vulnerable
to many of the malicious attacks. In fact, both DSR and OLSR protocols, which are the
two most popular protocols for on-demand source routing in multi-hop WMNs, are
vulnerable to malicious attacks (e.g., injections of bogus routing information, formation of
feedback loops by colluding adversarial nodes, identity spoofing, link spoofing, replay
attacks, etc.). To address these attacks, OLSRv2 provides inherent resilience by having
sequence numbers, ignoring unidirectional links, message interval bounds, etc., but still
recommends incorporating a security mechanism to address vulnerabilities.
The classical approach to mitigate above attacks is to use cryptographic tools to
authenticate information exchanged during the route discovery process. For example,
current tools include: (1) symmetric key techniques; (2) asymmetric key techniques; (3)
aggregate signature techniques; and (4) multi-signature techniques. Generally, these
techniques are inefficient or ineffective, for example, because the techniques require
extensive manual configuration, a trusted third party, and/or extensive computational
power requirements. However, for clarity, these techniques are briefly discussed below.
First, symmetric key techniques utilize a single shared key across all MRs to
generate integrity check values. Every MR verifies the integrity check value of a received
message and creates a new integrity check value after adding the source route to the
received message. Thus, in this method, the same secret key is configured on all MRs.
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Unfortunately, this renders manual configuration difficult and creates a framework where
overall security is compromised when one MR is compromised.
Second, asymmetric key techniques use identity-based signatures and avoid a
shared secret key that results in a single point of failure vulnerability. Instead, a public and
private/secret key pair (PK, SK) is generated for every MR. Then, the SK and identity of
the MR are used to generate an identity-based signature, which can be used as an integrity
check value. Thus, each MR verifies the identity-based signature of the previous MR using
a public key and adds its identity-based signature after successful verification of the
message from previous MR. However, with these techniques, every MR still needs to
know the public keys (PKs) of all other MRs in the deployment.
Often, a trusted third party is used to distribute certified public keys. In distributed
deployments, a key generation center (KGC) is often used as the trusted third party.
However, any identity-based cryptographic system using a KGC has an inherent key
escrow problem since the KGC always knows user keys. Thus, if the KGC is malicious, it
can impersonate a user. Moreover, in a WMN, all MRs may not have direct access to the
KGC. Without direct access, an MR must make a connection to another node, but this
connection will not be trusted. Still further, typically, a KGC signs keys for a particular
MR to allow other MRs to trust the particular MR, but this signed key does not allow the
particular MR to trust other MRs (i.e., the signed key does not necessarily create two-way
trust). Thus, KGCs may create a 'chicken and egg' type of problem where MRs have to
find a common KGC and make sure their keys have not been compromised. Some
techniques have been introduced to try to address these vulnerabilities. For example, some
techniques propose using strongly unforgeable certificateless signatures that resist attacks
from a malicious, but passive KGC. However, these techniques may be complicated and
expensive to implement, especially in a fully distributed self-organized WMN, where all
MRs need to have access to the certified public keys of all other MRs in the WMN.
Third, aggregated signature techniques authenticate route discovery in DSR by
having each MR sign route request (RREQ) packets they forwarded toward the destination,
as is shown in Figure 1 below. Then, the destination authenticates the accumulated source
route before generating a route reply (RREP) packet. However, as can be seen, with these
techniques, DSR floods the network with RREQ packets during route discovery, so most
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MRs waste computation and communication resources by signing, verifying, and
forwarding RREQ packets that are not included in the eventual route. Moreover, the
destination MR needs to verify each and every signature of a RREQ packet (signed by all
MRs in the path) by using the public key of each MR in a path. Unfortunately, verifying
sequential aggregate signatures is computationally intensive/expensive, so performing this
verification for a potentially unused path may be undesirable. Moreover, a KGC would
need to be used to distribute certified public keys and private keys, which is undesirable
for the reasons laid out above.

Figure 1: Conventional Aggregated Signature Techniques

Fourth, conventional multi-signature techniques use a private key to generate a
signature while the public keys of individual MRs are used to generate an aggregate public
key. The aggregate public key is then used to verify a multi-signature of the previous MR
and to generate a new multi-signature before sending to next MR. However, with
conventional multi-signature techniques, each MR must access a KGC to obtain a private
key and the certified public keys of all other MRs in the WMN, which is undesirable for
the reasons laid out above.
In view of the foregoing, the techniques presented herein use trusted platform
modules (TPMs) on MRs to provide certified private and public keys. In particular, the
techniques presented herein leverage cryptographic keys generated by TPMs to provide a
multi-signature scheme that enhances efficiency of authenticated route discovery in WMNs.
Typically, TPMs protects network device identities, but TPMs can also be used to generate
cryptographic keys. Utilizing the TPMs in this manner eliminates a KGC from route
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discovery and allows MRs to trust each other (instead of KGC) without the costs and
vulnerabilities associated with KGC. In fact, since cryptographic keys are provided by
TPMs of MRs, the techniques implicitly provide trustworthiness of the routes learned
between source and destination MRs.
More specifically, with the techniques presented herein, each MR can be configured
once (for its key lifetime) by a trusted authority, independently of all other MRs. For
example, a MR can connect to an authority (typically in a secure environment) to receive
a private key or can have a private key delivered securely (out of band) from the authority.
Thus, every MR will have a public and private/secret ley pair (PK, SK), provided by its
TPM (e.g., stored in microchip). The TPM itself could be built into hardware (e.g., an
ACT2 chip) and, thus, tampering would make hardware/device unusable. Moreover, since
TPMs do not expose security keys to the applications – and, instead provide options to
migrate the keys so that applications can use them for the authentication and encryption
methods – the TPM will provide an added layer of security. Thus, the present techniques
avoid the issues associated with KGCs discussed above. Once the private and public keys
are generated by TPM, the private keys can be used to generate signatures while the public
keys of individual MRs are used to generate an aggregate public key (e.g., in a multisignature scheme). The aggregate public key can be used to verify a multi-signature of a
previous MR and to generate a new multi-signature before sending to next MR (e.g., in a
multi-signature scheme).
Figure 2 below provides an example of how the techniques presented herein may
be utilized for authenticated route discovery in a WMN. Generally, the multi-signature
authentication scheme presented herein consists of five phases: (1) initial setup; (2) key
generation; (3) signature generation; (4) multi-signature verification; and (5) multisignature generation.
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Figure 2: Authenticated Route Discovery with the Techniques Presented Herein

In Figure 2, the following notations are used:






R(1, n) is a source route, e.g., {MR(1), MR(2) . . . MR(n)};
SIGN(i) is an individual signature on “h” using a private/secure key (e.g., “SK(i)”);
PK(i,j) is the aggregate public key of nodes MR(i), MR(i+1), . . . MR(j);
MSIGN(i,j) is a multi-signature on “h” by aggregating SIGN(i), SIGN(i+1), . . .
SIGN(j); and
R(,), MSIGN(,) is a RREP packet containing source route R(,) and multi-signature
MSIGN(,).

Each of the steps of Figure 2 is also described in more detail below.
First, during initial setup, all MRs get a public parameter and all nodes choose and
agree upon the system public parameters generated using a probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithm. The nature of the public parameter depends on the underlying crypto
system, but generally, the input includes a number of MRs in the deployment, security
parameters, etc., and the output is the public parameter. Additionally, MRs can be
onboarded in any order.
Next, during key generation, each mesh router (MR(i), where "i" - represents a
mesh node ID in subsequent usage, and "n" represent number of MRs in the path) generates
keys. Specifically, public keys of all MRs and TPM migration are enabled, which results
in the generation of public and private key pairs (PK(i), SK(i)), as well as an aggregate
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public key, PK(i+1,n). For example, the TPM on each mesh router (MR(i)) can generate
pairs of a long-term public key, PK(i), and a private key, SK(i), while also generating the
aggregate public key, PK(i+1,n), using public keys of all other MRs in the path (i.e.,
PK(i+1), PK(i+2) . . . PK(n)).
Third, during signature generation, each mesh router (MR(i)) uses the private/secret
key (SK(i)) of the mesh router (MR(i)) that was created using TPM and a message M
containing the source route information to output an individual signature (SIGN(i)).
Specifically, each mesh router (MR(i)) participating in the RREP propagation generates an
individual signature, SIGN(i), using a private/secret key (SK(i)) of the MR on the hashed
concatenation of the address in the source route of the message M by the PPT algorithm.
Fourth, during multi-signature verification, each mesh router (MR(i)) uses the
aggregated public key (PK(i+1,n)), aggregated multi-signature (MSIGN(i+1, n)), and the
source route information from previous MR included in the message M to render a validity
determination (e.g., to output valid or invalid). Specifically, each intermediate mesh router
MR(i) (other than the destination), receives a signed RREP packet containing the multisignature MSIGN(i+1,n). Then, each mesh router (MR(i)) verifies the multi-signature
(MSIGN(i+1,n)) using the aggregate public key (PK(i+1,n)) generated in the second step.
Notably, for the last hop before the destination MR(n) (e.g., MR(n-1)), the multi signature
(MSIGN(i+1,n)) denotes MSIGN(n).
Fifth, and finally, during multi-signature generation, each mesh router (MR(i)) uses
the multi-signature (MSIGN(i+1, n)) sent by previous MR and its signature (SIGN(i)) to
generate a new multi-signature (MSIGN(i,n)) to be sent to the next MR. If the multisignature (MSIGN(i+1,n)) verification is successful, a mesh router (MR(i)) generates the
multi-signature (MSIGN(i,n)) by using its signature (SIGN(i)) (e.g., by using its secret key,
SK, like in the third step). Then, each mesh router (MR(i)) replaces the multi-signature
(MSIGN(i+1,n)) present in the RREP with the newly generated multi-signature
(MSIGN(i,n)) before forwarding the RREP to the next hop MR (MR(i-1)).
Overall, the sequence of signature generation, multi-signature verification,
and multi-signature aggregation continues until the RREP packet containing the multisignature (MSIGN(1,n)) is delivered to the source. If the multi-signature (MSIGN(1,n)) is
verified using aggregated public key (PK(1,n)), the individual signatures (e.g.,
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SIGN(1),…..SIGN(n)) of corresponding MRs (e.g., MR(1),…MR(n)) in the discovered
source route to the destination MR (e.g., MR(n)) are verified collectively. Notably, unlike
aggregate signature techniques, the techniques presented herein verified signatures for a
selected path.
Among other advantages, these techniques provide an efficient, authenticated route
discovery protocol for WMNs. These techniques are particularly advantageous because
they eliminate a KGC, rendering the issues associated with using a KGC in a WMN
deployment moot. In fact, since the techniques provide a high level of security, the
techniques can be used in enterprise WMNs, including mesh networks with access points
servicing wireless clients (e.g., root access points (RAPs) and/or mesh access points (MAPs)
that typically require high-level of security. Moreover, the techniques presented herein can
be used to implement authenticated route discovery in any source-based routing protocol
and. The techniques can also be incorporated into WMN deployments utilizing IEEE
802.11ax, which supports higher bandwidth and is becoming increasingly utilized.
Moreover, since the Multi-signature scheme presented herein is applied on the RREP from
the destination to the source, hop-by-hop, ordering is unnecessary and, thus, the techniques
are easily scalable.
In summary, the techniques described herein provide an efficient and secure
signature scheme to authenticate route discovery in WMNs. Specifically, the techniques
provide a scheme where signatures are generated with cryptographic keys provided by a
TPM on each MR in the WMN. The keys can protect device identities, which may secure
the network devices against attacks, and, in at least some instances, the cryptographic keys
can also provide authentication and encryption at the software/application level. Overall,
the techniques may eliminate the need for a KGC in the WMN and do not require MRs to
cooperate to construct a signature. Thus, among other advantages, the techniques described
herein may be efficient and inexpensive to implement.
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